VALIDITY OF ANTI-NEGRO RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS: A RECONSIDERATION OF
THE PROBLEM
HARoLD I. KAHEN*

ALMOST two decades have passed since the Supreme Court, in
/
Corriganv. Buckley, rejected arguments that anti-Negro restricL
tive covenants are unconstitutional, and affirmed the enforce,ment by injunction of private agreements prohibiting the occupancy of
real property by Negroes. In the meantime, the problem of Negro housing
in cities, already aggravated by the general tendency toward urbanization
and the influx of Negroes into cities to take jobs created by World War I,
has again been intensified by the attraction of urban employment opportunities which has characterized the present war. The result has been that,
to a much greater extent than is the case with the population in general,
Negro housing is inadequate, both qualitatively and quantitatively to
meet the minimum requirements which an enlightened social policy
would seem to impose. The social problems have reached a boiling point
at a time when the current of Supreme Court decision seems to be flowing
in a direction favorable to constitutional protection against what were
once considered merely infractions of civil rights, or at any rate infractions irremediable in the federal courts. This is the justification for a reexamination' at the present time, of the constitutional and policy problems involved in the judicial enforcement, by injunction, of private agreements prohibiting the alienation of real property to Negroes or its occupancy by Negroes, 3 where such a disposition is desired by the owner of
the present interest in the land.
* Of the Illinois Bar, and now in the Army of the United States. The writer is greatly
indebted to Prof. Sheldon Tefit, of the Law School, University of Chicago, for his active encouragement and numerous helpful suggestions in the writing of this article.
* 271 U.S. 323, 46 S. Ct. 521, 7oL. Ed. 969 (1926).
*An excellent discussion of the general subject will be found in Martin, Segregation of
Residences of Negroes, 32 Mich. L. Rev. 721 (i934), where the legal problem is considered in
its sociological setting. Also of interest are Mangum, The Legal Status of the Negro 138-62
(194o); Miller,'Race Restrictions on the Use or Sale of Real Property, 2 Natl. B. J. 24 (1944);
Bowman, The Constitution and Common Law Restraints on Alienation, 8 Boston U. L. Rev. x
(1928); Bruce, Racial Zoning by Private Contract in the Light of the Constitutions and the

Rule against Restraints on Alienation,
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restrictions are generally framed as agreements, breach of which would
justify a suit for an injunction or an action for damages. However, covenants framed to coni98
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The earliest American case in which a court considered constitutional
problems in connection with the enforcement of restrictions on the sale or
occupancy of land by members of a particular racial group seems to be
Gandolfo v. Hartman.4 In that case the deed under which the plaintiff took
title to the land involved in the litigation contained an agreement that the
premises were never to be rented to a "Chinaman." The plaintiff having
conveyed a part of the property to the defendant, suit was brought by the
former to enjoin the latter from renting to "Chinamen," who were also
made parties defendant. In refusing relief, the court referred to the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, having noted that
this clause applies to courts as well as to legislatures, stated that:
It would be a very narrow construction of the constitutional amendment in question, and of the decisions based upon it, and a very restricted application of the broad
principles upon which both the amendment and the decisions proceed, to hold that,
while state and municipal legislatures are forbidden to discriminate against the Chinese
in their legislation, a citizen of the state may lawfully do so by contract, which the
courts may enforce. Such a view is, I think, entirely inadmissable. Any result inhibited
by the constitution can no more be accomplished by contract of individual citizens
than by legislation, and the courts should no more enforce the one than the other.

It is noteworthy that this opinion was written almost a decade after the
Civil Rights Cases- had established that the Fourteenth Amendment was
protection only against governmental action, and not against the activities of individuals in a private capacity. Consequently, it may be assumed
that the court considered the judicial enforcement of the restriction to be
the crux of the matter, and was not relying on the discrimination expressed
6
in the contract.
In subsequent cases involving restrictive covenants against Negroes
the Gandolfo case has generally been overlooked, or, when noticed, it has
been distinguished away or disregarded. In the state courts, a line of cases
beginning with QueensboroughLand Co. v. Cazeaux7 fails to recognize any
fer a right of entry for condition broken, i.e., to work a forfeiture of the property on breach of
the restriction, are not uncommon. Although this discussion is directed primarily towards
the usual case, where injunctive relief is sought to prevent or remedy a breach of the restriction, it is believed that the reasoning should apply as well to actions for damages or to enforce
a forfeiture.
4 49 Fed. x8i (Cal., 1892). The quotation is from p. 182.
s 109 U.S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835 (1883).
6In the latter half of its opinion, the court indicated that enforcement of the covenant
would also violate the most-favored-nation clause of a treaty between the United States and
China and was contrary to public policy, as well. Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181-83 (C.C.
Cal. 1892).

7136 La. 724, 67 So. 641, I9i6B L.R.A. 1201 (i9S).
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distinction between the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to
judicialenforcement of restrictive covenants and its application to the enforcement of such restrictions by the private actions of individuals. The
language of the opinions is suggestive that counsel may generally have
failed to spell out the constitutional issues, in terms of state action through
judicial enforcement,8 and have contented themselves, instead, with the
argument that the covenants themselves violate constitutional guarantees
-a contention which, so put, has long since been foreclosed by the doctrine of the Civil Rights Cases. Hence the tendency has been to brush
aside arguments as to constitutionality with little discussion other than
the simple statement, as in the Queensborough Land Co. case, that "the
Fourteenth Amendment, in so far as prohibiting discrimination against
the Negro race, applies only to state legislation, not to the contracts of
individuals."9
More than thirty years appear to have elapsed after the judgment in
the Gandolfo case before the question of the constitutionality of restrictive
covenants directed at a particular race was raised again in the federal
courts. Corriganv. Bucklero was a suit to enjoin one defendant, a white
land-owner, from conveying his land to the other defendant, a colored
would-be purchaser, in violation of a restrictive covenant against sale or
leasing to a colored person. The colored defendant took the position that
the covenant was void in that it deprived him of due process of law. Following the state cases, the court rejected his argument on the ground that
the civil rights clauses of the Constitution do not apply to private arrangements among individual citizens. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that,
8A case in which this issue does seem to have been squarely presented is Title Guarantee
and Trust Co. v. Garrott, 42 Cal. App. 152 (1919), where the court said, at p. 154: "The fourteenth amendment, it is true, applies to the judicial as w'ell
as the legislative department of the
state government. But the judiciary does not violate this provision of the federal constitution
merely because it sanctions discriminations that are the outgrowths of contracts made by
individuals."
9 136 La. 724, 728, 67 So. 641, 643, I916B L.R.A. 1201, 1203 (r915). Illustrative cases are:
Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, i81 Cal. 68o, I86 Pac. 596 (i919); Parmalee v. Morris,
218 Mich. 625, 188 N.W. 330 (1922); Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532, 42
A.L.R. 1267 (1925); Chandler v. Ziegler, 88 Colo. i, 291 Pac. 822 (1930); United Cooperative
Realty Co. v. Hawkins, 269 Ky. 563, io8 S.W. 2d 507 (1937); Meade v. Denistone, 173 Md.
295, 196 Atl. 330, I14 A.L.R. 1227 (1938). But see Miller v. Jersey Coast Resorts Corp.,
98 N.J. Eq. 289, 297, 13o Atl. 824, 828 (1925) to the effect that a restrictive covenant prohibiting members of a particular religious faith from purchasing land would be unconstitutional.
However, the opinion cites no authority, nor did the covenant involved in the case contain
such a provision, and the injunction was denied on the ground that there had been no breach
of the narrow restrictions established.
10299 Fed. 899 (C.A.D.C., 1924).
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in view of the Civil Rights Cases and similar decisions, the contention of
the colored defendant that the covenant was a denial of rights secured by
the Constitution did not raise a constitutional question sufficiently substantial even to support jurisdiction on appeal. In the Supreme Court the
contention was also made, apparently for the first time, that the decree of
the court enforcing the covenant, as distinguished from the covenant itself, deprived the defendants of their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Mr. Justice Sanford indicated that that particular
question had not properly been presented for review, but he went on to
say that, in any event, that contention was likewise without merit. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction."
Although Corrigan v. Buckley has never since been cited by the Supreme Court itself, it has been followed in subsequent cases involving
2
similar restrictions, both in the District of Columbia and in state courts.
Only a single court, the Supreme Court of Maryland, appears to have expressed any doubts of its soundness. In Meade v. Dennistone, 3 this court,
although following the Supreme Court rule to uphold the constitutionality

of judicial enforcement of an anti-Negro restriction, indicated its own
misgivings:
The constitutional question here raised having been thus settled [in Corrigan v.
Buckley] by an authority which, unless and until overruled, must be accepted, the only
thing for us to decide is whether the agreement before us is adequate to accomplish the
purpose intended ..... '4
Notwithstanding the fact that the decisions enforcing anti-Negro restrictions have been steadily increasing in significance, nothing in the opinions indicates that the social consequences of the rules enunciated have
been brought to the attention of the courts. When the Gandolfo case was
decided in 1892, the Negro population of the country was still almost entirely rural.'5 The covenant in that case represented a state of mind which
had culminated, a decade earlier, in the enactment of the Chinese Exclu"Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 46 S.Ct. 521, 70 L. Ed. 969 (1926). Neither the opinion in the Court of Appeals nor that in the Supreme Court mentions the Gandolfo case.
12Grady v. Garland, 89 F. 2d 817 (C.A.D.C., 1937); Herb v. Gerstein, 41 F. Supp. 634
(D.C.D.C., 1941); United Cooperative Realty Co. v. Hawkins, 269 Ky. 563, io8 S.W. 2d 507

(1937).
13

173 Md. 295, 196 Atl. 330, 114 A.L.R. 1227 (1938).

14

173

Md.

295, 302,

196 AtI. 330, 333, 144 A.L.R.

1227,

1232-3 (1938).

ISOf a total Negro population in igoo of almost 9,oooooo, only 2,000,000 lived in cities.

T. J. Woofter, Jr., in Recent Social Trends 567 (1933).
With respect to segregation in rural areas see Vance, "Racial Competition for Land" in
Race Relations and the Race Problem (edited by Edgar T. Thompson) 97, io6 (1939).
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sion Act, 6 but it is apparent that the draftsman of that particular covenant had not yet come to view Negro occupancy as a problem.
The twentieth century brought Negroes in unprecedented numbers to
the cities, especially in the North.'7 Generally constituting a depressed
class, economically, they could hardly have been expected to settle uniformly throughout cities, even in the absence of restrictions. 8 They
showed, instead, a tendency to locate in those sections where housing was
cheapest. This has been characteristic of immigrant groups, as well. 9
In the case of Negroes, however, there soon became evident a desire to
exclude from the more desirable neighborhoods even those Negroes who
could pay for better accommodations. Based in part on simple prejudice,
this desire was reinforced by the fears of property owners, since depreciation of property values is generally assumed to be an inevitable concomitant of Negro occupancy or even proximity.20 It expressed itself in legislaZ622 Stat. 58 (1882), 8 U.S.C. § 263.
17 The

following tables illustrate the growth of the Negro urban population.
Increase in Negro Population of Ten Leading Industrial Cities
1910
Number of

1920

o
Totalf
Negres

Pop.

New York .......... 91,709

1J.9

Chicago ............
Philadelphia ........
Detroit ..........
Cleveiand ...........
St. Louis....
....

2.0
5.5
1.2
1.5
6.4

44,2o3
84,459
5,741
8,448
43,960

Pittsburgh..........25,623
cicinnati.......
9,639
Indianapolis ........
Kansas City, Mo....

22,816
23,556

Nmb

Ngroe
egroes

152,467
109,458

oo

1930

a

Pop.

40,838

2.7
4.1
7-4
4.1

69,854

9.0

234,229

34,45I

4.7

37,725

5.x
9.3
9.5

30,079
34,678
30,719

4.3
6.4
7.5
21.0

9.5

1940

of b
o
Number
Negoes of Negroes

Number of

Pop.

327,706
233,903
219,599
120,o66
71,899
93,580

Total
of

Pop.

4.7
6.9
1.3

458,444
277,731
250,880

7.7

249,119

8.0
12.4

54,983

8.9

84,504
108,765

47,818
43,967
38,574

io.6
12.1
9.8

55,593
52,142
41,574

62,226

6.I
8.2
13.
9.2

9.6
.3.3

9.3
22.2

13.2
20.4

Increase in Negro Urban Population

Number of Negroes urbanized .......................
Percentage of Negroes urbanized .....................

Percentage of totalUnited Statespopulationurbanized...

1910

2920

2930

1940

2,684,797
27.3

3,559,473
34.0

5,293,913
43.7

6,253,588
48.6

45.8

51.4

56.2

56.5

Source: United States Census.

See chapter II, The Rapid City Growth, in Woofter, Negro Problems in Cities 26-36 (1928).
18For a discussion of the patterns of Negro settlement in cities, see ibid., 37-77.
19Report on Negro Housing of the President's Conference on Home Building and Home
Ownership 5 (1932).
20 The popular view that Negro "invasion" of an area necessarily depreciates property
values is not shared by all writers who have investigated the subject. The better view seems
to be that depreciation of property in such areas is temporary, due to sacrifice sales by white
owners in their haste to leave the area. When the property has been largely taken over by
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tion,21 especially municipal ordinances, segregating Negroes and in restrictive covenants.
Buchanan v. Warley,- the first case in the Supreme Court to hold one
of these segregation ordinances unconstitutional, was not completely successful in discouraging their subsequent enactment. As late as i94o, the
North Carolina Supreme Court was required to hold a segregation ordinance unconstitutional.23 But, as real estate brokers and local improvement associations have come to recognize the futility of promoting this
purpose by legislation, the restrictive covenant has been preferred as a
method of excluding Negroes from desirable neighborhoods.
Restrictive covenants covering wide areas, and enforced by injunction,
are capable of imposing much more drastic restraints than are segregation
ordinances patterned upon zoning ordinances. Moreover, whereas zoning
ordinances may be readily modified to conform with changes in political,
economic, and social conditions, well-drafted restrictions are likely to be
impregnable for an indefinite period.24 Indeed, the very inflexibility of such
covenants, initially, in preventing an influx of Negroes into a neighborhood has redounded to the detriment of property owners subsequently in
cases where changed conditions have made a good proportion of the
property in the neighborhood disposable advantageously only to colored
25

persons.
No exact figures seem to have been compiled to show the extent to
which residential property in cities is covered by covenants prohibiting
Negroes, and sacrifice sales have ceased, values appear to return to normal, unless other
factors intervene. See Report of the Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro in

Chicago

194-2I5 (1922),

for a discussion of such factors.

The evolution of such legislation is traced in Charles S. Johnson, Patterns of Negro
Segregation 173-6 (1943).
21

23

U.S. 60, 38 S. Ct. 16, 62 L. Ed. '49 (1917).
Clinard v. Winston-Salem, 217 N.C. iig, 6 S.E.
245

2d

867 (1940).

24 Among the theories which have occasionally been utilized to deny enforcement to restrictive covenants are (i) that conditions have changed (see note, Negro Restrictions and the
"Changed Conditions" Doctrine, 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 710 [1940]), (2) that the covenants
constitute illegal restraints on alienation (see Bowman, op. cit. supra, note 2), (3) that the
plaintiff has acquiesced in similar violations, (4) that restrictions were not uniformly imposed
originally and hence it is inequitable to bind A, where B, his neighbor, is free to use the property for a similar purpose. The results have varied in different jurisdictions and even in the
same jurisdiction. See note to Kathan v. Stevenson, 307 Mich. 485, 12 N.W. 2d 332 (1943)
in 42 Mich. L. Rev. 923 (1944), and 3 Tiffany, Real Property §§ 871-5 (3d ed. 1939).

2s Grady v. Garland, 89 F. 2d 817 (C.A.D.C., 1937) was a suit by white property owners,
whose houses were on the border of a restricted area and faced property occupied by Negroes,
to remove the restrictions as a cloud upon their title. Relief was denied on the ground that a
change of conditions in an adjoining neighborhood was immaterial so long as there had been
no such change with respect to the property covered by restrictions.
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alienation to or occupancy by Negroes. However, there appears to be an
increasing tendency toward the use of such covenants,2 and it can hardly
be questioned that a substantial proportion of urban residential property
is already affected.27 No less significant than the absolute amount of restricted property, of its proportion to the entire residential property in a
community, may be the location of the restricted property with relation to
established areas of Negro settlement. Restrictions covering a relatively
small amount of property may effectively constrict the area of Negro
settlement, if the restricted property substantially surrounds the Negropopulated area, or stands as a barrier to expansion in the only direction
toward which expansion is feasible.
Covenants on improved property are often sponsored by local improvement associations,21 which bring pressure upon householders to join with
their neighbors in imposing restrictions upon every piece of property in a
neighborhood, without exception. Not every such solicitation can be successful,29 and, unless the covenants are so drafted as to take effect only if
substantial unanimity is secured, those property owners who bind themselves are likely to discover, as time elapses and the neighborhood changes,
that they are in an unenviable position.3o
A more efficient method of imposing restriction throughout a neighborhood is the practice of subdividers to include racial restrictions in the
original deed to each lot in a subdivision. Of eighty-four subdivisions con26 Sterner, The Negro's Share 208-9 (1943). See Report of Pennsylvania State Temporary
Commission on the Conditions of the Urban Colored Population 131 ff. (1943).
27 An "estimate" that as much as 8o per cent of the residential property in Chicago is
covered by anti-Negro restrictions is given in "Iron Ring in Housing," 47 The Crisis 205
(i94o), quoted in i Myrdal, An American Dilemma 624 (I944). Though this figure seems too
high for credence, even if it includes informal agreements as well as formal written restrictions,
it is often quoted and no better one seems to be available. The "estimate" was the impression
of Robert Taylor, Chairman of the Chicago Housing Authority, but was based on no survey.
In a recent speech Newton C. Farr, former president of the Chicago Real Estate Board, stated
that in his opinion less than 4o per cent of the area was covered.
28There are said to be 175 such organizations in Chicago alone. Embree, Brown Americans
34 (1943).
29 In the Washington Park Subdivision of Chicago, the covenant which gave rise to the
litigation in Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 2, 61 S.Ct. 115, 85 L. Ed. 22 (1940) was so drafted as
to be enforceable only if the owners of 95 per cent of the frontage signed. In fact, the owners
of no more than 54 per cent of the frontage signed.
30 This was precisely the situation of the signers of the Washington Park Subdivision covenant, after the Supreme Court of Illinois had held in Lee v. Hansberry, 372 Ill. 369, 24 N.E.
2d 37 (1939) that Burke v. Kleiman, 277 11. App. 5i9 (1934) had conclusively established that
that covenant was operative. The signers could not dispose of their property to Negroes,
although in many cases their neighbors had already made such a disposition.
See William Henry Jones, The Housing of Negroes in Washington, D.C. 72-4 (1929) for a
discussion of similar occurrences.

ANTI-NEGRO RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

sidered in a study made some years ago, it was found that racial restrictions were imposed in forty, of which thirty-eight were in the more recent
instruments.31 The Manual on Land Subdivision published by the American Society of Civil Engineers 32 states:
Restrictive covenants in deeds specifying the exact use of the property, the side,
rear, and front yards, the cost of the house, the architecture, and even the race of the
inhabitants,are extremely useful in design. They should be outlined at the time the
design is made. The judicious use of restrictive covenants will do much to establish and
protect property values. Such covenants are valuable in all residential developments;
subdivisions far the poor, as well as for those of more ample means, benefit from such
controls.33
Following the commercial trend, the governmqnt agency which is con-,

cerned with the extension of credit for the construction and improvement
of private housing for low income groups appears to have promoted similar restrictions. "The Federal Housing Administration, in effect, extends
credit to Negroes only if they build or buy in Negro neighborhoods and to
whites only if they build in white areas which are under covenant not to
rent or sell to Negroes."34 However, the United States Housing Authority,
which develops public housing on a large scale, appears to have followed a
somewhat different policy.3s

Caught between increasing population pressure from within and restric3' Monchow, The Use of Deed Restrictions in Subdivision Development 5o
32In

(1928).

1939.

3 Am. Soc. of Civil Engineers, Manual on Land Subdivision 23 (1939). Italics added.
There follows a set of restrictions which are said to have been suggested by the Federal Housing
Administration. Included among them is the following: "No race or nationality other than
those for whom the premises are intended, shall use or occupy any building on any lot, except
that this covenant shall not prevent occupancy by domestic servants of a different race or

nationality employed by an owner or tenant. (The wording of this restriction should not be
used in actual restrictions which are to be recorded, but a racial restriction should be properly
drawn so that the objectives as above set forth will be acccomplished.)" Ibid.
3
4 1 Myrdal, An American Dilemma 625 (i944). See also id., 349-5o and Sterner, The Negro's Share 314-16 (i943). The writer is informed, however, that FHA policy in respect to
restrictive covenants is not determined centrally but by state administrators in the light of
local conditions.
3s "The United States Housing Authority ....
has attempted to prevent the spread of
residential segregation by encouraging occupancy of public housing projects by both whites and
Negroes, especially in neighborhoods where mixed occupancy was the rule prior to construction
of the public project." Putney, Civil and Social Rights of the Negro, i Editorial Research Reports 211, 228 (i939). But this policy seems to have yielded to the pressure of local opinion on
numerous occasions, and its success appears to have been spotty. See Sterner, The Negro's
Share 320 (1943).
Favors v. Randall, 40 F. Supp. 743 (Pa., 194), presented the question whether the policy
of a local affiliate of the Authority, to rent to Negroes in a ratio based on the proportion of
Negro occupancy of the site prior to construction of the project, was discrimination in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that the discrimination was reasonable and refused relief.
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tive covenants binding from without, Negro housing conditions have
shown a steady tendency toward deterioration, especially when compared
with the general trend. Dilapidation, congestion,16 and lack of sanitation
are common. 37 Lack of space for expansion has tended, moreover, to promote monopoly conditions within Negro areas, making it possible to collect high rentals for the most dilapidated property.38 This in turn has necessitated the taking in of lodgers to meet rent payments, with all 'fthe
social evils incident to this practice. The social cost of such slum conditions
in terms of lowering of the standards of public health, juvenile delinquency, crime, and other forms of social disorganization is inestimable. 39
The discontent which has been aroused by such conditions has been recognized as a potentially explosive element in an already highly volatile
social situation.4
Although it is clear that even in the absence of restrictive convenants
other social factors would operate to prevent the penetration of Negroes
into certain residential districts 41 it is accepted that the covenants are a
36 "In a single block in Harlem there are 3,87x people. Comparable concentration for the
entire population would result in all of the people of the United States living in one half of
New York City." Embree, Brown Americans 34 (1943).
"Illustrating the plight of Chicago's Negro population, Ferd Kramer, president of the
Metropolitan Housing Council, said about 3oo,ooo Negroes now live in accommodations 'which
normally would house only one-third that number ......
"Kramer said the huge war time increase of Chicago's Negro population, at a rate of
25,ooo to 30,000 a year, has been unaccompanied by expansion of housing facilities." Chicago
Sun, Nov. 29, 1944 (final ed.) p. 7, col. 3-6.
37 Report on Negro Housing, op. cit. supra, note ig; Sterner, The Negro's Share 166-2og
(i943); i Myrdal, An American Dilemma 375-9 (i944); Report of Pennsylvania State Temporary Commission, op. cit. supra, note 26, 71-i69. A detailed description of the Negro housing
situation in Chicago, at the present time, appears in a series of articles published in the Chi-.
cago Sun, beginning Jan. 8, 1945.
3SHeadley, "Rent," chap. VII in Woofter, Negro Problems in Cities X21-35 (1928).
While the near-monopoly position of landlords owning Negro-occupied property makes
ordinary maintenance unnecessary, the artificial increase of property values due to high rentals
required of Negroes also tends to prevent the removal of obsolete property and its replacement by construction which would utilize the land to the best economic advantage.
39 Report of Pennsylvania State Temporary Commission, op. cit. supra, note 26, 139-42,
147-53, Report on Negro Housing, op. cit. supra, note I9,r43-98. For a general discussion of

the significance of segregation see Wirth, Segregation, 7 Ency. Soc. Sci. 643 (1937) and Sterner,
The Negro's Share 200-2 (2943).
40 "In Chicago, the lack of housing facilities has caused an aggravation of discontent which
students have warned is approaching a crisis. The iron ring of restrictive covenants which
surrounds the Negro community has prevented its normal expansion in spite of the fact that
the colored population has more than doubled in the last two decades ..... " "Iron Ring in
Housing," 47 The Crisis 205 (1940).
4' Among these factors are the tendency to charge Negroes higher rents than white persons
for property outside the "Black Belt," the tendency of landlords to refuse to rent to Negroes,
even in the absence of formal restrictions, and the financial inability of most Negroes to pay
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principal factor in segregating the Negro population of cities in small areas
and denying to Negroes the opportunity to reside elsewhere. 42 The practical consequences of such segregation in terms of reduced standards of living have already been noted. It follows that judicial enforcement of antiNegro restrictions amounts substantially to a denial to Negroes of the
right to a reasonable choice of adequate home-sites in the community.
Once this is recognized, the legal doctrines precluding enforcement become more apparent.
If the litigation of constitutional issues and issues of land policy in a
sociological vacuum has resulted in socially undesirable doctrines, it
would seem appropriate, in any litigation which may hereafter be undertaken, to include the relevant sociological data in the record and briefs.
No court should be called upon to determine the validity of an anti-Negro
restrictive covenant on the tacit assumption that only the parties litigant
and the parcel of land as to which they assert rights will be affected by the
decision. Instead, the relationship of the particular restriction to the entire community should dearly appear. A general indication of the type of
sociological material which may be drawn upon has already been given.
In presenting a case involving the validity of a particular restriction, a
study should be made of the extent to which land in the adjacent community is affected by anti-Negro restrictions. The facts may be obtainable
from local title companies, from real estate brokers, or from published
handbooks on local real estate. The most accurate and complete sources,
of course, are in the books maintained by the local recorders of titles, but
this method of research appears to be unduly laborious, if the facts can be
otherwise discovered. Further proof may then be adduced by assembling
the census figures on the increase of the local Negro population and comparfor housing in expensive neighborhoods. There is also the desire on the part of many Negroes to
remain in areas where they are socially acceptable, even if the physical surroundings are undesirable, and the correlative desire to avoid being subjected (if they move to a predominantly
white neighborhood) to daily contact with ofttimes bitterly hostile neighbors. The report of
the Chicago Commission, op. cit. supra, note 20, a study of the race riots in Chicago in i919,
while it devotes some 125 pages (io6-230) to the distribution of the Negro population and to
its housing problem, and discusses in some detail the methods used by property owners to prevent Negro infiltration into white areas, does not seem to mention restrictive covenants as a
factor in segregation. Apparently such covenants had not become popular in Chicago prior
to the increase in Negro population which resulted from World War I.
42"In Washington, the 'covenant' seems to be the most widely employed method for
keeping Negroes out of 'exclusively white' residential districts." Jones, op. cit. supra, note 30,
p. 70.
"If the [Supreme] Court should follow up its action of declaring all local laws to segregate
Negroes unconstitutional by declaring illegal
also the private restrictive covenants, segregation in the North would be nearly doomed, and segregation in the South would be set back
slightly." i Myrdal, An American Dilemma 624 (1944).
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ing this increase with the expansion of the local areas of Negro settlement.
If the areas of Negro habitation in the locality have not increased in proportion to population increases, and the density of the local Negro population has been increasing at a greater rate than that of the white population, there is evidence of the effect of the restrictions. Still more cogent
evidence might be adduced by plotting on a map of the city the areas of
Negro habitation at various times in the past, the direction in which expansion of the Negro settlement has moved, and the areas in which restrictive covenants have been imposed. A tendency for Negroes to move
toward the restricted area but to stop at its boundaries is evidence that
the covenants are a principal factor in denying to Negroes the right to
43
live where they desire.
The consequences of such segregation should also be shown. Published
studies of the Negro housing situation are available for many large cities 44
and should disclose such items as the physical condition of housing, the
extent of overcrowding, and the rent level as compared with housing
available to white persons. Expert testimony may also be available in a
particular case.
If, as has been suggested, it can be shown that the tendency and effect
of the enforcement of anti-Negro restrictive covenants in a particular
community is substantially to deny to Negroes, who are otherwise capable of paying for better housing facilities, the opportunity of securing
reasonably adequate housing, refusal to enforce such covenants would appear to be in keeping with the best traditions of courts of equity. That it is
not every covenant with respect to land which will be specifically enforced in equity is well settled. 45 Even in the limited field of racial cove43Illustrating the techniques which are suggested are the maps in Woofter, Negro Problems in Cities 4o-67 (1928) and Lindstrom, The Negro Invasion of the Washington Park
Subdivision 8, 15, 20, 32 (master's thesis, Univ. Chi. i94i).
44 Examples of such studies are the Report of the Chicago Commission, op. cit. supra, note
2o; Jones, op. cit. supra, note 3o; Report of the New York State Temporary Commission on
the Condition of the Urban Colored Population, N.Y. Legis. Doc. (1938) No. 63, vol. i8, 16ist
sess.; Report of the Pennsylvania State Temporary Commission, op. cit. supra, note 26.

4SIn Norcross v. James, 14o Mass. i88, 2 N.E. 946 (r885) the court refused to enforce the
covenant of a land-owner that he would permit no quarry to be worked on land which he retained, notwithstanding that the covenant had been made on the occasion of the conveyance
by such owner of a contiguous tract, which was a quarry of six acres. The language of Holmes,
J., is pertinent to the question under consideration:
"The question remains, whether, even if we make the further assumption that the covenant was valid as a contract between the parties, it is of a kind which the law permits to be
attached to land in such a sense as to restrict the use of one parcel in all hands for the benefit
of whoever may hold the other, whatever the principle invoked. For equity will no more enforce every restriction that can be devised, than the common law will recognize as creating an
easement every grant purporting to limit the use of land in favor of other land. The principle
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nants, doctrines limiting enforcement have been recognized.46 Basically
such doctrines must be founded on conceptions of policy, although terms
more specific than "public policy" may be used in stating the results.
The question whether a court of equity will specifically enforce a system
of contracts, which operate to prevent an entire race from securing reasonable living accommodations in a community, and effective to accomplish
that purpose, is a question which, it is believed, remains open in every jurisdiction. In the cases enforcing anti-Negro restrictions the opinions ordinarily give no indication that the general factual background, which should
be a determining factor in the result, was presented for judicial consideration.47 Hence the cases in which the restrictions were simply enforced, and
of policy applied to affirmative covenants, applies also to negative ones ....new and unusual
incidents cannot be attached to land by way either of benefit or burden .....
"Again, this covenant illustrates the further meaning of the rule against unusual incidents.
If it is of a nature to be attached to land, as the plaintiff contends, it creates an easement of
monopoly,-an easement not to be competed with,--and in that interest alone a right to prohibit one owner from exercising the usual incidents of property. It is true that a man could
accomplish the same results by buying the whole land and regulating production. But it does
not follow, because you can do a thing in one way, that you can do it in all; and we think that,
if this covenant were regarded as one which bound all subsequent owners of the land to keep
its products out of commerce, there would be much greater difficulty in sustaining its validity
than if it be treated as merely personal in its burden." 140 Mass. i8s, 191-3, 2 N.E. 946, 948-9.
46See note 24, supra.
47 Mays v. Burgess, decided Jan. 24, 1945, in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, appears to be a notable exception. Nevertheless, the majority of the court was not moved
to depart from the rule of the Corrigan case on the basis of the facts presented. Groner, J.,
writing the opinion of the court, stated that "rights created by [racial] covenants ....have
been so consistently enforced by us as to become a rule of property and within the accepted
public policy of the District of Columbia. Little need now be said on the subject of that policy.
The proposition is not new and was unsuccessfully urged in the Corrigan case ....
in this
court and in the Supreme Court. And nothing is suggested now that was not considered then
....public policy ....may not-properly-be found in our personal views on sociological
problems." Miller, J., concurred on the ground that the law was established by the decisions,
and that, if changes are in order, it is the function of Congress or of the Supreme Court to make
them. Edgerton, J., dissenting, contended that "aside from the fact that our Corrigan decision
was probably unsound when it was rendered ....it is quite inapplicable today because general
conditions have not remained the same. Questions of policy have no meaning in a vacuum but
relate to particular situations. The housing situation in the District of Columbia has changed
since 1924 ..... The conditions in which many of the 187,ooo Negroes in the District of Columbia have long been obliged to live are now worse than ever."
In California, where there has been relatively much litigation involving restrictive covenants, recent opinions also indicate that counsel may have begun to present factual background material to the courts. It has been received with varying degrees of enthusiasm.
In Fairchild v. Raines, 151 P. 2d 260, 267 (Cal., 1944), Traynor, 3., concurring in the reversal of a judgment enforcing a restrictive covenant, summarized relevant sociological data and
indicated that a trial court ought to consider whether enforcement would be contrary to the
public interest. More specifically, he stated that "The trial court should ...
, be directed to
make findings as to the housing facilities available in the district occupied by the colored population and to determine whether there is a need for additional housing that would justify an
expansion of the district by absorption of the restricted area." 15i P. 2d 260, 269.
On the otherlnand, in Stone v. Jones, 15 2 P. 2d 18, 22 (Cal. App., 1944), affirming the en-
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even those which contain without more a fleeting statement that enforcement violates no public policy,48 need not be considered controlling. In
such northern states as have civil rights laws49 prohibiting the segregation
of the races, even in public places, where physical contact is much closer
than is usual between neighbors, the argument is available that enforcement of restrictive covenants contravenes the public policy of the state
as expressed in such laws.5°
The question remains whether the decision of a state court, enforcing
anti-Negro restrictive covenants by injunction, in a fact situation such as
has been described, raises questions under the Fourteenth Amendment.
forcement of a restrictive covenant, the reaction of the court to apparently similar arguments
was that "Collateral possiblities or indirect consequences are beside the issue. Changes, or the!
likelihood thereof, incident to the growth of a community, may create or forecast perplexing
social problems, but such problems, from the very nature of things, cannot be solved by the
courts in the process of litigation of a purely private nature. Any attempt to do so would be
an unwarranted interference with the functions of other branches of the government already
equipped with power and means for the comprehensive consideration of such problems."
Similar language appears in Burkhardt v. Lofton, 146 P. 2d 720, 724-5 (Cal. App., 1944).
48 Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (19x8); Ridgway v. Cockburn, 163
Misc. 511, 296 N.Y.S. 936 (1937); Chandler v. Ziegler, 88 Colo. i, 291 Pac. 822 (1930); Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625, i88 N.W. 330 (1922); Lyons v. Wallen, 133 P. 2d 555 (Okla.,.
1942).

In Illinois, the only judicial discussion of the constitutional and policy questions is on its
face a dictum: "Appellants have not contended that the restrictions violate any of the amendments to the United States constitution, nor that they are against public policy-but complainant has seen fit to argue, at some length, that the restrictions do not violate the fifth, thirteenth
or fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and that they are not against
public policy. While it is entirely unnecessary, because of appellants' attitude, for us to consider this argument, we may state that the following authorities cited in support of it sustain
the position of complainant: [citing cases]. In spite of the instant argument of complainant,
App. Si9, 533-4
appellants have not seen fit to file a reply brief." Burke v. Kleiman, 277 Ill.

('934).

Moreover even this dictum was based on the briefs in what was later found to be a collusive
law suit, which was brought, apparently, for the purpose of establishing this very point among
others. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 38, 6i S. Ct. 'S, 117, 85 L. Ed. 22, 25-6 (i94o),
reversing Lee v. Hansberry, 372 Ill.
369, 24 N.E. 2d 37 (I939). These cases were concerned
only with the effect of the judgment in Burke v. Kleiman and did not discuss the constitu-

tionality of restrictive covenants.
49E.g., L. 1885 p. 64, Ill. Rev. Stat. §§ 125-8 (Bar Assn. Ed. 1943).

soThis analogy was rejected, however, in Burkhardt v. Lofton, 146 P. 2d

720

(Cal. App.,

x944), where, apparently, it was strongly (but unsuccessfully) urged that the public policy of

the state had changed, subsequent to the early decisions, to such an extent that restrictive
covenants should not have been enforced.
H. B. 563, 63d Gen. Assembly of Ill. (1943) provided for the invalidation of provisions in
deeds, leases, and similar documents which prohibited occupancy or ownership of real estate
on grounds of race or color. The bill was tabled, as were similar bills submitted to the 6ist and
62d General Assembly, and S. B. 281, 62d Gen. Assembly of Ill. (194i), which provided for
the amendment of the Housing Authorities Act to prohibit racial segregation in public housing.
For the apparently serious suggestion that legislation invalidating anti-Negro restrictions

may be unconstitutional see Illinois Inter-racial Commission, Research Memorandum No. 6,
Restrictive Covenants,

1-14 (mimeographed publication, i944).
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Buchananv. Warlq 5s' and the cases which followed itP established in the
Supreme Court that legislation restricting the right of a member of a particular race to live on particular land denies rights guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v.
Chicagos is authority that judicially established rules are subject to the
same constitutional limitations as those established by the legislature.
Judicial enforcement by injunction of restrictive covenants, where, as in
the ordinary case, the covenants have been systematically imposed over a
large area, achieves precisely the same purpose as a zoning ordinance prohibiting Negroes from settling in the area.5 4 In either case, the power of
government is exercised directly on the individual, and on a discriminatory basis. Hence it is arguable that, for constitutional purposes, judicial
enforcement of restrictive covenants is state action which should not be
permitted where legislation to the same effect would be invalid55 It
should be relevant, moreover, that, as has been indicated, the denial by
judicial decree of the right freely to settle in the community is not simply
of academic concern, but is fraught with the gravest of practical consequences, in that it dooms the Negro to utilization of housing situated in
relatively constricted areas and of a type which would not otherwise be
acceptable.
Smith v. Allwright56 indicates an inclination, in the Supreme Court, to
recognize as state action activities formerly deemed to be only of private
concern. The case overruled Grovey v. Townsend,5 7 which had held that
the action of the Democratic party of Texas, excluding Negroes from
membership, was not state action and hence did not deprive Negroes of
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the Court at
its last term held that, in view of the relationship of the primaries to the
whole electoral process, the delegation to the party, by the state, of the
power so to fix membership qualifications as to exclude Negroes, made the
subsequent act of the party, excluding Negroes, the act of the state. Con51 245 U.S. 60, 38 S. Ct. I6, 62 L. Ed. 149 (I917).
S2Harmon

v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668, 47 S. Ct. 471, 71 L. Ed. 831
Ed. 1128 (1930).

(1927);

Richmond v. Deans,

281 U.S. 704, 50 S. Ct. 407, 74 L.
S3

i66 U.S.

226,

17 S. Ct. 581, 41 L. Ed. 979 (1897).

S4 The

public law element in restrictive covenants is more apparent when it is realized that
the so-called contract is enforced in the teeth of the owner of the present interest in the land.
ss On the issue whether injunctions enforcing covenants are unconstitutional governmental
action, the language of Corrigan v. Buckley is dictum on its face, the Court having stated that
the issue was not properly before it.
56321 U.S. 649, 64 S. Ct. 757, 88 L. Ed. 701 (I944).
-7

295 U.S. 45, 55 S. Ct. 622, 79-L. Ed. 1292 (1935).
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sequently the discrimination was prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. Exclusion of Negroes had been accomplished by resolution adopted
by the state convention of the party, and it is significant that no legislation of Texas was relied on as having authorized such a resolution. Recognition by the common law of the state of a right so to exclude was sufficient to constitute the resulting exclusion the act of the state. In the opinion the Court emphasized that the importance of the right to vote was a
large factor in its decision. It is difficult to assume that the elementary
right to live in a community would be deemed of less importance.
During the current term, the Supreme Court has again considered the
validity of so-called private action discriminating against Negroes. Steele
v. Louisville & Naslzille Railroad Co.s 8 was a suit brought by a Negro
railroad employee to enjoin the enforcement of an agreement between a
union and the employer, which agreement discriminated against colored
employees. The Railway Labor Act s 9 made the union the exclusive collective bargaining representative for the craft of which the plaintiff was a
member. The constitutional argument was that the act was unconstitutional, if, having given a union exclusive bargaining rights, it permitted
the union so to use them as to discriminate against Negroes. The Court
indicated that if the statute were so construed, serious constitutional
questions would arise. These were avoided by construing the act to require the union to bargain in a non-discriminatory manner, for the whole
craft, including even such members of the craft as were non-members of the
union. This construction was adopted despite the absence of any statutory provisions specifically regulating the manner in which the union was
to perform its duties. In a concurring opinion, Mr. justice Murphy made
it clear that he was willing to accept the Court's construction, because
the act would otherwise be invalid. It should be noted that, in this case,
the relationship of the governmental action, i.e., the legislation, to the discrimination was far less direct than in the ordinary restrictive covenant
case. In the labor cases, though the unions exercise powers conferred by
legislation,10 the final discriminatory exercise of such powers is their own
act. In the restrictive covenant cases, the "private" discrimination is ineffectual, in every contested case, until the judicial ageiacy of the government implements it by injunction.
It may be significant that lower courts have cited Corriganv. Buckley
5865 S. Ct.

226,

89 L. Ed. (I944).

Stat. I 85, 45 U.S.C. § i5i.
6o However, unions have often achieved the status of exclusive bargaining representatives
even independent of legislative aid.
5948
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and used the language of private action to justify refusal of relief against
discriminatory action by labor unions, in cases somewhat similar to that
just discussed. 6' Clearly the authority of these lower court cases has now
been shaken. Another indication of the direction of decision may be that
Mr. Justice Rutledge, while still a member of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, took occasion to indicate doubts as to the validity of
restrictive covenants.6 It is believed that the result of recent decisions
has been so to undermine the dictum69 for which Corrigan v. Buckley is
usually cited, as to raise a question whether the language of that case continues to express the law.
It is contemplated that, with the conclusion of the present war, new
construction will relieve present large-scale inadequacies in urban housing.
New houses will be built in areas vacant at present, to be occupied by persons whose financial resources are proportionable to construction costs.
At the same time still-useful housing will be released for occupancy by
groups which are financially less able and which at present endure substandard conditions. This process will entail adjustments in the composition of particular communities, which adjustments can be, on the whole,
socially beneficial. However, restrictive covenants, if they continue to be
enforced by courts, will, in many communities, deny to Negroes the opportunity to secure a share either in the new construction or in the older
and still-useful properties. Although the burden of the restriction will fall
with the greatest weight on Negro would-be purchasers and tenants, it
will be felt as well by property-owners whose market will be thus restricted
and whose cost of obsolescence will thereby be artificially increased. Judicial failure to abandon a rule so costly in its social consequences to the
community at large will ultimately require legislative correction, unless
abominable housing conditions for Negroes, and the pernicious effects of
such conditions on the general community, are to be accepted as a permanent condition of American life.
61E.g., National Federation of Railway Workers v. National Mediation Board, iio F. 2d
529 (C.A.D.C., i94o) cert. den. 310 U.S. 628, 6o S. Ct. 975, 84 L. Ed. i399 (I94O); James v.

International Brotherhood of Boiler Makers, Iron Ship Builders and Helpers of America, 54

F. Supp. 94 (Cal., 1944).
61Hundley v. Gorewitz, 132 F. 2d 23 (C.A.D.C., 1942), was a suit for an injunction to enforce an ordinary restrictive covenant. The "changed conditions" rule was applied to deny
relief. The cryptic concurring opinion of Rutledge, J., is reproduced: "I concur in the result for
the reason that if such a covenant as is involved in this case is valid in any circumstances, as to
which I express no opinion, it is not valid or enforceable in the conditions shown on the present record and stated in the opinion of the court." 132 F. 2d 23, 25 (italics added).
63 Note 55, supra.

